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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the obstacles to deployment of QKD solutions has 
been the distance limitation. Solutions using relays have 
been proposed but these rely on link-by-link key 
establishment. We present a new technique to extend the 
distance of a quantum key distribution channel using an 
active relay. Each relay acts as an intercept/resend device 
and allows the establishment of an end-to-end key. It has 
been argued that such relays cannot be used to extend the 
distance, but we show that with a suitable adaptation of 
the protocol the effective key distribution distance can be 
increased. 
 
Index Terms— Quantum key distribution, relays, 
network security. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From its beginnings as a theoretical curiosity some two 
decades ago Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is now a 
commercially available technology that is currently 
undergoing trials in a number of locations [1]. The 
technology offers a way of establishing a random 
sequence of binary digits between two end users in such a 
way that the secrecy of the established bit strings can be 
guaranteed. This bit string can then be used as a key in 
cryptographic applications. 
One of the biggest obstacles to the widespread 
introduction of QKD techniques is the distance limitation 
in optical fibre which restricts current applications to a 
few tens of kilometers. The distance can be extended by 
using relays. In standard commercial applications these 
relays establish link-by link keys. As Bechmann-
Pasquinucci and Pasquinucci have shown [2] it is 
possible to use relays in an end-to-end mode in which the 
relays simply act as intercept/resend devices passing on 
the state they measure. However, it has been argued in [2] 
that this cannot increase the distance for a QKD 
transmission over that of a standard channel without 
relays. The key transmission rate also decreases 
exponentially with the number of relays. 
We show that neither of these limitations for end-to-
end relays persists with a modification of the protocol. 
Furthermore we show that the fraction of transmitted data 
that can be used for key establishment is independent of 
the number of relays and is precisely equal to ½, that is, 
the same fraction as for a standard QKD channel without 
relays. 
This result shows that end-to-end keys can be 
established over significant distances using these relays. 
Elsewhere [3] we have shown how these relays can be 
secured using a secret sharing technique. Taken together 
these methods describe a practical and secure 
implementation of QKD for the transmission of quantum 
keys over long distances. 
 
2. LIMITATIONS OF INTERCEPT/RESEND 
RELAYS FOR QKD 
 
We consider a channel over which Alice and Bob wish to 
exchange keys using QKD. The distance between them, 
however, is too great to do this using a normal 
transmission and so one or more relays Rn must be used 
The intercept/resend technique described in [2] 
allows the establishment of end-to-end keys. The protocol 
described there, however, cannot be used to extend the 
distance of the QKD transmission. In effect the authors 
consider the entire communication Alice – Relay – Bob 
as a single communication. If the distance between Alice 
and the relay is only just sufficient for a successful 
quantum key exchange the photon loss for the second half 
of this channel is clearly too great to establish a 
successful QKD transmission using this protocol. 
The relay, or node R1 using the above terminology, 
simply measures the state of the incoming photons as in 
the usual QKD protocol and re-transmits the photons in 
the measured state. This process is repeated for all of the 
intermediate nodes until the destination point on the 
channel. 
 Let us consider a simple channel consisting of 
Alice, relay node R1 and Bob. In the BB84 protocol [4] 
there are two alphabets which are formed from the 
eigenstates of complementary operators. Let us call these 
two operators  and   with eigenstates | and |	 
respectively. There are 8 possible measurement chains for 
each photon. For example, Alice could choose to encode 
using the  basis alphabet, relay node R1 could choose to 
measure and retransmit in the   basis alphabet and Bob 
could choose to measure in the   basis alphabet. The 
possible variations are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The possible measurements and codings for a 
simple 3 node channel. The ‘key’ column indicates that the 
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measurements can lead to establishment of a key between the 
nodes listed. Thus for the instances described in the first two 
rows where all three nodes have used the same alphabet or 
coding scheme then all parties can use these photons to establish 
a key. In row 3 and 4 it is seemingly only possible to use these 
measurements to establish a key between Alice and node R1. It 
is not possible to establish a quantum key using the 
measurements indicated in the last two rows. Note that in this 
case only ¼ of the transmissions are usable by Alice and Bob to 
establish a key between them, as opposed to ½ in the standard 
protocol without an intermediary. However, this is offset by the 
fact that overall ¾ of the transmissions are useful with the 
addition of the intermediary as opposed to only ½ in the usual 
protocol. This is a critical factor in the adaptation of the 
protocol to enhance the key rate that we outline in section 4. 
Alice Relay R1 Bob Key 
X X X A - R1 -B 
Y Y Y A - R1 -B 
X X Y A – R1 
Y Y X A – R1 
X Y Y R1 – B 
Y X X R1 – B 
X Y X No key 
Y X Y No key 
 
By extending this to a chain of n nodes, that is the 
two endpoints Alice and Bob and 
  2 trusted 
intermediate relay nodes we see that the only 
transmissions where no useful data can be obtained are 
those which have an alternating pattern of measurements 
so that the fraction of useful transmissions is given by 
 
     1    


                                             (1) 
 
In all other cases a key can be established somewhere 
between two nodes. We see from equation (1) that as n 
increases the useful fraction approaches 1. However, as n 
increases the number of transmissions that are useful to 
the two endpoints Alice and Bob decreases. The only 
transmissions where Alice and Bob can establish a key 
are those in which all nodes have chosen the same basis 
and thus the fraction of transmissions that can be used to 
establish an end-to-end key is 1  . 
It would seem from the above discussion that there 
are two apparent limitations on using relays in this ‘pass-
through’ mode. Firstly, it appears that they cannot be 
used to extend the distance for a QKD channel and 
secondly, it appears that the fraction of timeslots that can 
be used to establish an end-to-end key decreases 
exponentially with the number of intermediate relays.  
The first of these limitations arises because the signal 
to noise performance as the distance extends ensures that 
the quantum signal cannot be distinguished from noise. 
This would certainly be the case if all the relays did was 
to operate according to the protocol outlined. However, 
as we now show, if the relay protocol is adapted the 
argument outlined in [2] to demonstrate the impossibility 
of distance extension for QKD using these pass-through 
relays is invalid.  
 
3. OVERCOMING THE DISTANCE 
LIMITATION 
 
Let us consider a channel in which there is only one relay 
R1. Let us further suppose that the distance between Alice 
and Bob is too great for them to establish a quantum key 
without some kind of assistance. There will be some loss 
factor ξ on the channel between Alice and R1 that means 
that the relay no longer has sufficient data points to 
resend to overcome the SNR problems for the second hop 
on the channel. 
When we view the channel as two separate hops like 
this the solution becomes obvious. The relay must operate 
in such a way to increase the SNR performance for the 
second hop. There are two ways to achieve this. The relay 
can simply wait to resend until sufficient data points have 
been collected to allow the resend transmission to 
proceed at an acceptable data rate to overcome the SNR 
limit for the second hop. 
The second solution is for the relay to use a padding 
technique. In the timeslots where nothing is received by 
R1 a new photon is transmitted encoded in a random basis 
with a random bit value as in the standard two-user QKD 
channel. The relay just keeps a record of the timeslots 
that are padded and those that are resends from the data 
received from Alice. At the end of the channel Bob now 
receives a signal of sufficient strength to overcome the 
SNR limitations but only a fraction of these, governed by 
ξ, have originated from Alice. One advantage of the 
padding technique over the delay method is that it allows 
the establishment of a pool of key material between R1 
and Bob which may be useful. 
As the number of relays, and therefore the number of 
hops, is increased we see that the fraction of data received 
by Bob that originates with Alice scales as ξ–m where m is 
the number of hops. This will ultimately limit the 
practical operational distance for QKD relays by slowing 
the Alice – Bob key rate to an unacceptably low level. 
We shall discuss the practical operational parameters for 
these relay channels elsewhere. 
 
4. OVERCOMING THE EXPONENTIAL 
REDUCTION OF THE USEFUL DATA  
 
As we have seen, the introduction of a pass-through 
relay operating as a simple intercept/resend device leads 
to an apparent reduction in the eventual key rate between 
Alice and Bob, as described by equation (1). In order to 
illustrate that this is not, in fact, the case we consider a 
channel in which there are two relays, R1 and R2. In Table 
2 and Table 3 we show the possible bit values for the 
timeslots when the participants in the channel use the 
coding bases          and          , 
respectively. 
It is important to note that the relays, unlike an 
eavesdropper, are not adversaries, but can act as 
cooperative entities assisting the eventual establishment 
of a secret key between Alice and Bob. It is this critical 
detail that allows the relays to cooperate in such a way as 141
to overcome the apparent problem of the overall key 
reduction factor given in equation (1). 
 
Table 2. The possible bit values transmitted when the channel 
participants adopt the coding scheme,          . Each 
row corresponds to a possible timeslot for the QKD 
transmission. 
Alice ( R1 ( R2 ( Bob ( 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
Table 3 The possible bit values transmitted when the channel 
participants adopt the coding scheme,          . Each 
row corresponds to a possible timeslot for the QKD 
transmission. 
Alice ( R1 ( R2 ( Bob ( 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
 
Recall that what we are trying to achieve with QKD 
is the establishment of a shared sequence of secret 
random bits between Alice and Bob. So all we need to do 
is to ensure that the correct bit value is established at each 
hop of the channel. Accordingly, we can pair these 
timeslots, as desired, in order to establish a continuous bit 
path through the channel. This process is done post-
transmission when the data points have been collected. 
In the 2nd and 3rd columns of Table 2 we see that the 
two relays have chosen different bases. In normal QKD 
protocols this would be rejected as incapable of 
transmitting the key. However, we see in Table 3 that this 
gap is ‘bridged’ because the relays have chosen the same 
coding basis. So in order to establish the bit value from 
Table 2 at the second relay the first relay now chooses a 
suitable timeslot from Table 3 and informs the second 
relay that this timeslot is to be used. The original bit 
value transmitted by Alice can therefore be established. 
In effect this is equivalent to a bit flipping by the relays at 
suitable points where the bit here determines which 
coding basis to use. 
Providing we can draw a continuous path of 
legitimate QKD transmission through the communication 
we can use this bit flipping to propagate the key through 
the channel. As in the standard QKD system the actual bit 
value coded on the photon is never revealed, only the 
basis and timeslot information. The key is thus 
propagated in secret. 
It is clear upon reflection that each timeslot, except 
those originating from           or       
 , can be paired in this fashion in the post-processing. 
The key reduction factor is therefore precisely the same 
as that for a single QKD channel with only two users. In 
other words, the introduction of relays does not affect the 
amount of potential key data. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We have shown how the distance limitation of QKD 
can be overcome by the use of relays operated in an 
intercept-resend mode in order to establish a true end-to-
end key between Alice and Bob. It has also been 
established that the introduction of such relays does not 
affect the amount of data that can be used to form the 
eventual key. This is an important new technique that will 
allow the establishment of a QKD system over long 
distances. 
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